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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has created an expansive environmental law regime that includes
both civil and criminal penalties for environmental violators. The criminal portion
of that regime has just become more complex. In a recent decision, Southern Union
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court made a significant alteration that affects,
specifically, criminal fines.1 The Southern Union ruling has far reaching effects in
two common forms of environmental crime fines: (1) fines that involve penalties
that are measured per day of violation; and (2) fines that are weighed in gain to a
defendant or loss to society under the Alternative Fines Act. 2 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union will have significant ramifications in environmental law because it is a constitutional ruling, meaning it will affect both state
and federal laws.3 All this, coupled with the fact that increasing numbers of environmental enforcement cases are being pursued criminally by the federal govern-

1. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012).
2. Bruce Pasfield & Elise Paeffgen, Supreme Court’s Southern Union Decision Helps Level the
Playing Field for Corporations Subject to Criminal Fines, 13 ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMM.
NEWSL.
2,
3,
5–6
(2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eecc/201208_eecc.authcheckdam
.pdf.
3. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating the ruling applies to both federal and state laws).
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ment, makes Southern Union a particularly important alteration in environmental
crime law.4
In effect, the Southern Union court added another layer of complexity to already complicated environmental crime cases, dramatically changing how certain
cases will be litigated.5 The Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury
trial guarantees require all facts that increase a defendant’s maximum criminal fine
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.6 In effect, this meant that the jury in
Southern Union had to find a violation on each and every one of 752 days where
the defendant company was charged with improper storage of mercury because the
charging statute had a per day fine scheme. 7 Prior to the ruling, judges were allowed to make factual determinations in sentencing that affected a criminal defendant’s criminal fine, such as determining the number of days where violations had
occurred.8 In effect, Southern Union results in a broad expansion of the jury trial
requirements in criminal fine cases. 9
Through its expansion of jury trial requirements, Southern Union creates a series of new problems and challenges for the justice system. Five of these problems
and challenges will be discussed in this article. The first challenge that the article
will discuss is Southern Union’s requirement that indictments and verdicts specify
more facts relating to criminal fines than trial judges had previously required.10 In a
case like Southern Union, this could be as complicated as making a count for each
day of violation, totaling 752 counts. A second challenge this article discusses is
questions relating to the amount of inferences a jury can make regarding those
facts.11 This aspect of the article can be stated as a hypothetical. When Southern
Union is remanded, will the jury have to hear evidence of a violation on each of the
752 days, or could they infer a violation took place over 752 days after seeing evidence of a violation on just a handful of days? A third challenge the article will
4. See Beth S. Gotthelf & Joseph E. Richotte, More Environmental Cases Are Going Criminal:
How to Protect and Prepare-the Value of Audits and Compliance Programs, 13 ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT &
CRIMES
COMM.
NEWSL.
2,
9
(2012)
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eecc/201208_eecc.authcheckdam
.pdf (“Those operating in industries highly regulated by federal, state, and local environmental protection
agencies have seen an increase in the number of violations being escalated from administrative notices of
violations and fines, or even civil penalties, to criminal prosecutions.”).
5. See United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (quoting Don R. Clay,
EPA Assistant Administrator of the EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, as saying
“RCRA is a regulatory cuckoo land of definition . . . I believe we have five people in the agency who understand what ‘hazardous waste’ is.”); see also David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age:
The Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
1223, 1224 (2009) (stating environmental laws and regulations are “often are mind-numbingly complex”);
see also Walter D. James III, Environmental Crimes Trials – More Complicated Now?, ENVTL. CRIMES
BLOG
(June
22,
2012,
8:57
AM),
http://environmentalblog.typepad.com/environmental_crimes_blog/2012/06/environmental-crimes-trialsmore-complicated-now.html.
6. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352.
7. Id. at 2352.
8. E.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009).
9. Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 256, 266 (2012) (stating that “by extending Apprendi to
a characteristically regulatory sanction imposed against an institutional defendant, Southern Union suggests
that if the defendant is entitled to a jury for the underlying conviction, then he should be entitled to a jury on
facts that determine all accompanying penalties.”).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.B.
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discuss is the effect Southern Union has on ever complicated environmental crime
trials.12 A fourth challenge this article will discuss is a consequence of Southern
Union. That is the case may, in effect, result in more prosecutions for individual
liability that results in jail sentences because of the additional complications Southern Union adds to cases involving criminal fines. 13 Fifth and finally, the article will
discuss whether Southern Union has any application to civil penalties.14 This article
will discuss these new problems and challenges in the context of environmental
enforcement at both the state and federal level.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union, it is necessary
to examine the prior Supreme Court case law that led to Southern Union. Prior to
Southern Union, the Supreme Court only required juries to determine all facts that
increased a criminal defendant’s term of incarceration—not criminal fines.15 In
fact, in a previous case the Supreme Court stated in dicta that applying such a rule
to criminal fines “surely would cut the rule loose from its moorings.” 16 However, in
Southern Union the court disavowed its own dicta and applied the rule to criminal
fines.17 The ruling in Southern Union was not novel. In fact, it was only the extension of a ruling handed down twelve years before in Apprendi v. New Jersey.18
A. Apprendi
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court laid out its standard for judicial fact finding
that leads to a determination of a criminal defendant’s term of incarceration. 19
There, the Court held that the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, along with the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees,
require that all facts that increase a defendant’s maximum term of incarceration be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.20 The facts in Apprendi involved a
New Jersey defendant who was accused of discharging a gun into the home of an
African American family that had recently moved into his all-white neighborhood.21 He was indicted on charges for alleged shootings and possession of various
weapons.22 Nothing in the indictment, however, referred to a hate crime or a crime
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part III.D.
14. See infra Part III.E.
15. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351–52 (2012).
16. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009).
17. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5 (stating “[w]e think the statement is at most ambiguous,
and more likely refers to the routine practice of judges’ imposing fines from within a range authorized by
jury-found facts. Such a practice poses no problem under Apprendi because the penalty does not exceed
what the jury’s verdict permits. In any event, our statement in Ice was unnecessary to the judgment and is
not binding.”) (citations omitted).
18. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 553 (2000).
19. Id. at 552–53.
20. Id. at 466.
21. Id. at 469.
22. Id.
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with racial prejudice.23 Later, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose.24 At sentencing the judge found the crime “was motivated
by racial bias,” and enhanced the sentence on a preponderance of the evidence
standard.25 Though the New Jersey legislature had previously made the hate crime
enhancement a sentencing factor, the jury never made a factual finding that the
crime was motivated by racial bias.26 On appeal, it was held that the judge’s finding
of racial bias was permissible because it was within the legislature’s power to make
the hate crime enhancement a sentencing factor.27 However, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the trial judge’s factual determination that the crime
was motivated by racial bias.28
The Supreme Court had multiple reasons for its reversal. First, the Supreme
Court wanted to ensure that terms of incarceration were based on facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt.29 The Court found the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary because criminal convictions result in the most severe of legal sanctions—a loss of liberty and a criminal stigma. 30 Second, the Court wanted to preserve the jury’s role in criminal convictions as reflected in the Sixth Amendment
and historical practices.31 The Court based its reasoning on the small amount of
discretion that judges historically had in felony sentencing, stating “the English
trial judge of the later eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing.”32 Thus, the Court stated the Apprendi rule was a reflection of the large
role that juries play in criminal trials, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 33
Finally, the Court argued that the simple interests of justice mandate that a criminal
defendant should not be treated differently on a matter of procedure—whether an
enhancement is a sentencing factor or a trial factor.34 Thus, the Court stated:
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed: “The law threatens certain pains if
you do certain things, intending thereby to give you a new motive for not
doing them. If you persist in doing them, it has to inflict the pains in order
that its threats may continue to be believed.” New Jersey threatened Apprendi with certain pains if he unlawfully possessed a weapon and with
additional pains if he selected his victims with a purpose to intimidate
them because of their race. As a matter of simple justice, it seems obvious
that the procedural safeguards designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted pains should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for punishment. Merely using the label “sentence enhancement”

23. Id.
24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
25. Id. at 471.
26. Id. at 471.
27. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
28. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474.
29. Id. at 477.
30. Id. at 484.
31. Id. at 476.
32. Id. at 479 (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the
French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, 36–37 (A. Schioppa
ed. 1987)).
33. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518.
34. Id. at 476.
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to describe the latter surely does not provide a principled basis for treating
them differently.35
This line of reasoning was taken up by the Southern Union court, which expanded the Apprendi rule from criminal incarcerations to both criminal incarcerations and criminal fines.36
B. Southern Union
A circuit split on whether or not to apply Apprendi to criminal fines was resolved in Southern Union.37 Initially, the First Circuit did not apply the Apprendi
rule to criminal fines in Southern Union.38 Instead, the First Circuit relied on dicta
from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oregon v. Ice.39 In that case, the Supreme
Court stated that applying Apprendi to criminal fines “surely would cut the rule
loose from its moorings.”40 Following this dicta, the First Circuit asserted that “no
traditional jury function had been curtailed” by allowing judges to make factual
findings pertaining to fines in sentencing. 41
The First Circuit’s ruling conflicted with rulings from the Second and Seventh
Circuits.42 The Second Circuit, in United States v. Pfaff, held that the Apprendi rule
did apply to criminal fines.43 There, the Second Circuit held the Apprendi rule applied when a judge made pecuniary loss determinations that increased a defendant’s
fine, who was charged with tax evasion, from $3 million to $6 million.44 The Second Circuit held the fine violated Apprendi because doubling the defendant’s criminal fine based on facts that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury
“affected the appellant's substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness of the
proceedings.”45 Another circuit that applied Apprendi to criminal fines was the
Seventh Circuit.46 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. LaGrou Distribution
Systems Inc., held a district judge had “no authority to sentence” a defendant corpo35. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 40 (M.
Howe ed. 1963).
36. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352–53.
37. Id. at 2349.
38. United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S.
Ct. 2344 (2012).
39. Id. at 34.
40. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009).
41. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d at 34.
42. See United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. LaGrou Distrib. Sys. Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006).
43. Pfaff, 619 F.3d at 175.
44. Id. at 174–75. The judge made this determination under the Alternative Fines Act. Id. The
Alternative Fines Act states: “If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results
in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater
of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). Thus, the Alternative Fines
Act allows fines above the statutory maximum in amounts equal to twice the economic gain or loss of the
offense of the conviction. Id.
45. Pfaff, 619 F.3d at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Marcus,
130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010)).
46. United States v. LaGrou Distribution Sys. Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006).
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ration to a $1 million criminal fine absent a jury finding that the crime justified a
departure from the default statutory fine amount of $500,000. 47 There, the court
stated:
[T]he problem is that the district court did not give a special interrogatory
with the jury instructions or verdict form asking the jury to find a loss
amount. Thus, at sentencing, it was the district judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard to find the loss amount, not a jury finding
loss amount beyond a reasonable doubt.48
These different court rulings set the stage for the Supreme Court to decide the new
constitutional question presented in Southern Union.
The facts in Southern Union exemplify an old and common problem where
low-income and minority communities often have a high concentration of facilities
that produce hazardous chemicals.49 The Southern Union case began when Rhode
Island youths broke into the building and took 140 pounds of mercury, played with
it, and spread it around their homes in a local apartment complex.50 All in all, 150
residents of five apartment buildings were displaced for two months while the mercury in their building was cleaned up. 51 Although all of the residents, who were
tested for mercury, did not meet the standards for hazardous exposure, some residents had elevated mercury exposure blood levels.52
These events precipitated from the improper storage of the mercury by a natural gas company called the Southern Union Company.53 Southern Union was storing the mercury in a dilapidated and unguarded facility located in a residential area
with a frequent history of break-ins and vandalism.54 The actual mercury was
“‘stored’ in doubled plastic bags placed in kiddie pools on the floor of [a] brick
building.”55 Ample evidence from company letters and meetings indicated the
company knew the mercury was being stored in a dangerous manner. 56 At trial, the
Southern Union Company was convicted of knowingly storing hazardous mercury
in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).57 However,
the company appealed the trial judge’s determination that the violation took place
over 762 days.58 Though the trial court set a maximum fine at $38.1 million and an
actual fine at $6 million, the Supreme Court reversed the fine because the district
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Dominique R. Shelton, The Prevalent Exposure of Low Income and Minority Communities to Hazardous Materials: The Problem and How to Fix It, 32 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS’N J. 1, 1 (1997);
Valerie J. Phillips, Have Low Income, Minorities Been Left Out of the Environmental Cleanup?, 38
ADVOCATE 16, 18–19 (1995) (pointing out the danger to migratory farm workers that can result from chemical exposure).
50. United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S.
Ct. 2344 (2012).
51. Id. at 24.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 22.
55. Id.
56. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d at 23.
57. United States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201, 205–207 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d, 630 F.3d
17 (1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
58. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
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judge engaged in judicial fact finding that went beyond the scope of the Sixth
Amendment as laid out by the Apprendi rule, which had previously only been applied to criminal incarcerations.59 Thus, the Supreme Court extended the Apprendi
rule to include criminal fines, requiring that juries make all factual findings that
increase a criminal defendant’s criminal fine.60 In applying the rule, the court stated
their ‘“core concern’ is to reserve to the jury ‘the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense.’ That concern applies whether the
sentence is a criminal fine, imprisonment, or death.”61 Thus, the court made a clear
rule that all facts that affect a criminal defendant’s sentence—whether a term of
incarceration or a criminal fine—must be determined by the jury. 62
In Southern Union the Supreme Court backed up its ruling with historical
analysis “suggesting that English juries were required to find facts that determined
the authorized pecuniary punishment.” 63 The Court stated the rule that juries must
determine facts relating to criminal fines “is an application of the ‘two longstanding
tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence’” that Apprendi and the Sixth
Amendment were based upon.64 First, “the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a
defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
his equals and neighbors.’”65 Second, “an accusation which lacks any particular
fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is . . . no accusation within
the requirements of the common law, and it is no accusation in reason.”66 The
Court’s ruling followed the arguments of amicus briefs arguing that applying the
Apprendi rule to criminal fines was a reaffirmation of the traditional role of the jury
and vital to enforcing the Sixth Amendment. 67
Thus, the Court stated the ruling preserved the historic jury function in “determining whether the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.”68 As such, the ruling followed a trend in Supreme Court cases
that applied the Apprendi rule “to a variety of sentencing schemes that allow[ed]
judges to find facts that increase[ed] a defendant's maximum authorized sentence.”69 To support the assertion that the Southern Union case was consistent with

59. Id. at 2352.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2350 (quoting Ice, 555 U.S. at 170).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2353.
64. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2354.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Brief of Criminal Procedure Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. 11-94), 2012 WL 195309 (arguing “there is considerable evidence suggesting that the jury’s role in the colonial period was similar in setting fines as for assessing the length of sentences”); Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, S.
Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. 11-94), 2011 WL 3664464 (arguing requiring that
the jury make factual determinations relating to sentencing “is critical to ensuring uniform nationwide enforcement of the Sixth Amendment.”).
68. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163 (2009)).
69. Id.
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prior decisions, the court cited a number of its previous decisions that applied the
Apprendi rule to various sentencing schemes.70
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union can be tied to the government’s indictment of the Southern Union Company. Indictments serve as the initial
pleading in a criminal case and, like other pleadings, they require that the government states every element of the charged crime. 71 The government’s indictment
was fatal because it did not specify the precise dates where the Southern Union
Company committed an RCRA violation—a fact that affected the size of the company’s criminal fine.72 The indictment stated the Southern Union Company stored
hazardous waste in violation of RCRA “[f]rom on or about September 19, 2002
until on or about October 19, 2004.”73 Violations involving knowing transportation
of waste to an improper facility or knowing treatment, storage, or disposal of waste
under RCRA are punishable by “[a] fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of
violation.”74 Since, the indictment did not specify the specific dates where a violation took place, it did not contain all the facts relevant to the Southern Union Company’s criminal fine.75 This lack of specificity in the indictment led to a lack of
specificity in the jury instructions in the case. The jury instructions defined “on or
about” by stating:
You will note that the Indictment charges that some of the offenses were
committed "on or about" a certain date. The proof need not establish with
certainty the exact date of the alleged offense. It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense
was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged. 76
Since the jury was instructed to not establish the dates of violation with exact certainty, the dates of violation could not have been found on a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.
In effect, the lack of specificity in the date of violation opened the door for
the district judge to have to determine an element of the criminal RCRA violation
in sentencing—over how many days the violation occurred.77 However, the indictment would not have violated the Apprendi rule if, hypothetically, the government

70. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274–75 (2007) (applying the rule to an elevated “upper term” of imprisonment); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (imposing the
rule on a scheme that increased the imprisonment range for defendant under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that were mandatory at the time); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 229–300 (2004) (applying the
rule to a scheme that added imprisonment over the “standard range” defined by statute); Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 588–589 (2002) (applying the rule to a scheme where the death penalty was authorized upon
the finding of aggravating sentencing factors); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466–469 (2000)
(applying the rule to an extended prison term based on defendant violating a “hate crime” statute).
71. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY MANUAL, at VII-4 (1991).
72. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
73. Indictment, S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. CR 07 134 T) 2007
WL 3123420.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(7)(B) (West 2013).
75. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
76. Jury Instructions at 13, United States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201 (2012) (D.R.I.
2009) (Cr. No. 07–134 S), available at http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/menu/judges/jurycharges/CRdocs/07134S%20US%20v%20Southern%20Union.pdf (emphasis added).
77. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
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had made a specific charge for each of the 752 days of violation. 78 Making a charge
for each day of violation, however, would undoubtedly be cumbersome. Luckily,
alternative ways to charge an environmental crime that has a per day fine exist and
are discussed in subsequent sections of this article.79
The ruling in Southern Union had many opponents because it gave rise to
many new complications in criminal fine trials. One source of opposition came
from the government.80 The government provided multiple arguments against extending Apprendi to criminal fines.81 First, the government argued that requiring
juries to determine facts relating to fines caused confusion, which would require
additional expert testimony.82 Second, the government argued that extending Apprendi might prejudice defendants because there would be situations where they
would have to simultaneously argue they did not violate a statute and argue that
their violations were minimal.83 Finally, the government argued extending Apprendi would be impractical because fines often rely on facts that may be unknowable
before a trial ends.84 Such arguments highlight the complications that Southern
Union created for the government in criminal fine cases.
Another example of opposition to the ruling in Southern Union came from the
dissenters in the case.85 Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito all joined in a fifteenpage dissent to the opinion.86 The dissenters took issue with the majority in many
places.87 Notably, the dissenters argued Southern Union was bad for defendants in
three ways.88 First, they argued the opinion would negatively affect defendants because in many cases they would have to make two conflicting arguments: (1) that
they did not commit a crime and (2) that they only committed it for a small period
of time.89 Second, the dissenters argued the ruling would allow new evidence to
come in at trial to prove daily violations that otherwise would have been prejudicial
to the defendant.90 They pointed out that the company in Southern Union had the
court exclude prejudicial evidence of the removal of the mercury to a local apartment complex, but under the new scheme such evidence might now come into trial
as it would aid the government in proving daily violations. 91 Finally, the dissenters
78. See infra Part III.A.
79. See infra Part III.A.
80. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2356.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2356–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2370–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2370 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. This is commonly referred to as the 403 balancing test. Id. The dissenters
were recognizing the fact that the ruling in Southern Union would allow the prosecutor to bring in additional evidence to prove daily violations. 132 S. Ct. 2344 at 2370–71. Such evidence could have taken the form
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argued that further complicating the trial requirements in cases involving criminal
fines would only create more plea deals and less actual trials. 92 They argued a justice system where “plea bargaining is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system [but] is the criminal justice system” is problematic because prosecutors are
advocates and not neutral adjudicators.93 Thus, the dissenters stated the opinion
would only perpetuate a justice system where ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are plea bargains. 94
Despite all these increased complications in environmental crime, Southern
Union is a correct step in guaranteeing fundamental rights to criminal defendants
charged with a criminal fine. As such, Southern Union is a correct step towards
guaranteeing fundamental jury rights in environmental cases. It is a reaffirmation of
the fundamental Sixth Amendment right, and the fact that the criminal stigma
should only be imposed after it has been painstakingly proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Southern Union, the Supreme Court was correct in making the law reflect
the fact that there is certainly a far larger stigma in a $50 million criminal fine than
a $10,000 criminal fine. With an understanding of the complications, there still are
many workable options to charge criminal environmental fines.
Despite all the arguments against Southern Union, there is merit in the argument that that the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights to criminal defendants charged with a criminal fine. Southern Union is a reaffirmation of the fundamental Sixth Amendment right and fact that the criminal stigma should only be
imposed after it has been painstakingly proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 95
Though a term of criminal incarceration is undoubtedly different from a criminal
fine, there are some similarities. The big similarity is that both criminal fines and
terms of incarceration carry a criminal stigma. 96 Indeed, the larger the fine or term
of incarceration, the larger the stigma. 97 Just as a one month term of incarceration
has less of a stigma than a life sentence, a $50,000 fine has less of a stigma than a
$7 million fine. What the Supreme Court ruled in Southern Union reflects this idea.
Furthermore, Southern Union still leaves the government with many options in
environmental crime cases.98

of evidence showing individual children playing with the mercury on specific days—something that would
have been very prejudicial to the Southern Union Company. Such hypothetical evidence would be prejudicial because some jurors might have a tendency to want to punish the company for exposing children to
mercury. However, the evidence would also be very probative because it is necessary for the government to
prove daily violations. Under the 403 balancing test the evidence would only not come into trial if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403. Thus, such hypothetical evidence would probably be admissible under Southern Union where it may not previously been admissible.
92. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2371 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
94. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352.
96. Developments in the Law, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1300, 1301 (1979).
97. Id. at 1305.
98. See infra Part II.C; see generally Developments in the Law, supra note 96.
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C. Overview of Criminal and Civil Enforcement of Environmental Laws
In order to understand the ruling in Southern Union it is important to understand what types of criminal and civil enforcement options the government can use
to ensure environmental compliance. One of the principal choices the government
must make, and perhaps most important, is whether it should pursue criminal or
civil liability against a defendant.99 Other choices exist for the government when a
defendant is either an individual or a corporate entity.100 It makes a substantial difference if a defendant is a corporate entity or an individual because corporate entities cannot serve jail time, whereas individuals can. 101 Though the government can
pursue both criminal and civil liability against a corporation, corporate criminal
enforcement is substantially different from individual enforcement. 102 However, in
certain circumstances the government can make individual corporate officers liable,
thus, taking advantage of a form of corporate enforcement that is similar to individual enforcement actions.103 These types of enforcement options, as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of enforcement of such options, are discussed below.
a. Corporate Defendants
One type of environmental enforcement is corporate enforcement, which involves a case brought by the government against a corporate entity. In such enforcement actions the government can bring either a civil or criminal case, or both a
criminal and civil case against a corporation.104 Such corporate enforcement is
common and is the type of enforcement that was pursued in Southern Union. Because it is impossible to put a corporation in jail, in corporate criminal cases the
government, instead, penalizes the corporation through criminal penalties and fines.
Such criminal enforcement of environmental laws has real-world consequences for
corporations in two ways. First, enforcement results in fines and penalties imposed
by the law.105 Second, enforcement results in “reputational penalties” that lead
businesses to lose portions of their market shares.106 These “allegations or charges
that a firm violated environmental regulations correspond to economically meaningful and statistically significant losses in the firm’s share values.” 107 Such “repu99.

See Henry Klementowicz et al., Environmental Crimes, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 541, 545

(2011).
100. See EPA, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 6
(2011), available at
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-overview-2011.pdf.
101. See id. at 4 (quoting James Strock, former EPA Assistant Administrator for enforcement).
102. Id. at 6.
103. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975).
104. See, e.g., Julie Cart, BP Faces Civil Trial Over Gulf Oil Spill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/19/nation/la-na-bp-trial-20130220 (stating “[h]aving just paid $4 billion
to settle criminal charges, BP now risks a [civil] fine of as much as $17 billion in the trial set to begin next
week.”).
105. See, e.g., S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352 (reversing the trial court’s imposition of a 6 million dollar fine).
106. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 666–68 (2005).
107. Id. at 653–55.
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tational penalties” result from both civil and criminal enforcement, but criminal
enforcement creates more of a stigma, tending to result in greater “reputational
penalties.”108 Civil enforcement, on the other hand, causes a predictable amount of
economic damage to a corporation through a fixed fine. 109 However, it lacks the
stigma of a criminal conviction that can be a powerful deterrent.110 The scope of
this paper is not broad enough to fully discuss the debate that ensues regarding civil
and criminal enforcement of environmental laws, but a brief overview is necessary
to fully understand the ruling in Southern Union.111
To understand corporate criminal liability it is necessary to look at the legal
framework that is used to hold a corporate entity criminally liable. The doctrine of
corporate criminal liability is rooted in respondeat superior, also known as vicarious liability.112 Through vicarious liability the acts and intent of a corporation’s
agents are automatically imputed to the corporation if the agent is acting in the
scope of her employment for the benefit of the corporation. 113 Thus, it is possible
for even the criminal acts of low-level employees to be attributable to a corporation.114 This sort of liability may even be possible in cases where a corporation may
genuinely pursue environmental compliance. 115 Such corporate criminal liability
gives rise to a controversial area of law with many opponents.116
Opponents of corporate criminal liability offer many criticisms. They point
out the inconsistencies of holding an entity vicariously responsible for acts that it
may not condone.117 Instead, opponents suggest civil penalties provide a more precise amount of economic punishment than criminal penalties.118 The idea is that
civil penalties result in a precise amount of economic loss to a corporation—the
amount of the civil fine.119 Conversely, these opponents argue criminal penalties
result in unpredictable economic impacts to corporations due to loss in market
share.120
On the other side, those in favor of corporate criminal responsibility have
made many arguments. As mentioned before, proponents of corporate criminal
liability argue criminal sanctions for corporations offer a stigma that is a powerful

108. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503,
1506 (2007) (stating “the hammer of corporate criminal liability should remain in the toolkit of responses to
serious corporate misconduct” and prosecutors should not have “less leverage than usual in dealing with the
best educated, most sophisticated, and most well represented class of defendants.”).
109. V.S. Khanna, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532–34 (1996) (making the case that the economic effects of a criminal stigma on a
corporation are unpredictable and, in contrast, civil penalties offer a more preferable way of punishing a
corporation because they cause a precise amount of harm).
110. See Beale, supra note 108.
111. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 109, at 1533–34.
112. Klementowicz, supra note 99, at 548.
113. Id.
114. Ved P. Nanda, Chapter 2 Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is A New Approach Warranted?, 9 IUS GENTIUM 63, 65 (2011).
115. See id.
116. See generally Khanna, supra note 109, at 1533–34.
117. Nanda, supra note 114, at 65 (stating “because corporations cannot act on their own or form
criminal intent, there is no theoretical justification for the doctrine”).
118. Khanna, supra note 109, at 1533–34.
119. Khanna, supra note 109.
120. Khanna, supra note 109.

2013]

COMPLICATING THE COMPLICATED: SOUTHERN
UNION AND HOW ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CASES
JUST BECAME MORE COMPLEX

127

tool for prosecutors to use to deter corporate misconduct. 121 In fact, the EPA has a
policy to charge environmental violations criminally to provide maximum deterrence, pointing out the fact that criminal charges are filed against sixty-seven percent of violators.122 Another governmental agency, the Department of Justice, provides the following rational for corporate criminal liability:
Corporations should not be treated leniently because of their artificial nature nor should they be subject to harsher treatment. Vigorous enforcement of the criminal laws against corporate wrongdoers, where appropriate, results in great benefits for law enforcement and the public, particularly in the area of white collar crime. Indicting corporations for wrongdoing
enables the government to be a force for positive change of corporate culture, and a force to prevent, discover, and punish serious crimes.123
In particular, the DOJ reasons there is more reason to indict a corporation in
many environmental crime cases because there is often “a substantial risk of great
public harm” with environmental crimes, which are often public welfare crimes. 124
The government’s emphasis on criminal environmental corporate enforcement
shows such criminal enforcement will remain a fixture in environmental enforcement.125 Governmental agencies seek corporate criminal enforcement because it
results in greater protection for the public from environmental violations that can
have immense public impacts.126
b. Individual Defendants
There are several options available to the government through individual enforcement of environmental crimes. 127 Criminal enforcement of environmental
121. Beale, supra note 108, at 1506.
122. EPA, supra note 100, at 6 (stating “corporate managers will think twice about deliberately
breaking the law if they understand that they face incarceration and personal criminal fines for criminal
conduct, rather than consequences that will be borne solely by the company”).
123. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200(A) (2008), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.200.
124. Id. § 9-28.200(B).
125. See, e.g., Office of Public Affairs, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deepwater
Horizon
Incident,
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE
(Nov.
15,
2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html (stating “BP Exploration and Production
Inc. (BP) has agreed to plead guilty to felony manslaughter, environmental crimes, and obstruction of Congress and pay a record $4 billion in criminal fines and penalties for its conduct leading to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster that killed eleven people and caused the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history”).
126. See id.
127. Specific Idaho federal district court cases show the thrust of federal environmental enforcement in Idaho and the consequences federal enforcement can have on individual Idaho defendants. Idaho
has multiple examples of individual defendants being convicted for criminal violations of federal environmental laws. Moses is an example of an Idaho case where an individual defendant was sentenced to jail
time for an environmental violation. United States v. Moses, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1220 (D. Idaho 2009).
There, a defendant developer was convicted of the excavation and placement of dredge and fill material in a
stream in violation of the Clean Water Act and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. Id. at 1218,
1220. Another example is Vierstra, where an Idaho dairy farmer had a misdemeanor conviction for a negli-

128

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50

crimes can be used as a tool against individual defendants who act alone in their
crime as well as individual defendants who are in a position in a corporation that is
responsible for the crime. Individual enforcement is commonly believed to result in
greater deterrence for environmental crime because it comes with the threat of jail
time or loss of personal assets.128 In fact, the EPA prefers individual enforcement
because it provides greater deterrence for environmental crime. 129 A recent emphasis in individual enforcement has led to about seventy percent individual enforcement and thirty percent criminal enforcement by the EPA.130
One area where individual defendants may face criminal liability involves the
Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine. Through this doctrine prosecutors can
hold individual corporate officers responsible for both criminal and civil violations
of environmental laws.131 Importantly, the doctrine only extends to responsible
corporate officers, not mere corporate shareholders.132 In United States v. Park, the
Supreme Court outlined the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine. 133 There, the
Court stated “the Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant
had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either
to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct the violation complained of,
and that he failed to do so.”134 Addressing concerns over the strict liability characteristics of the doctrine, the Court stated the corporate officer has a duty to exercise
“the highest standard of foresight and vigilance” and that a breach of this duty has a
high level of blameworthiness and culpability. 135
Though the doctrine was originally created under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, the “doctrine’s most important field of application . . . has become
liability under environmental statutes on both the federal and state level.”136 Under
the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine, corporate officers have been subject

gent discharge of dairy waste into the water of the United States in violation of the Clean Water Act. United
States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Idaho 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 3269211 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012).
Furthermore, another example is King, where an Idaho rancher was convicted of three felony violations of
the Safe Drinking Water Act and one felony “materially false” statement for injecting waste water into an
aquifer. United States v. King, 660 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011).
128. See, e.g., EPA, supra note 100, at 6.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673–74 (1975). The Responsible Corporate Officers
Doctrine is a way to hold corporate officers personally liable and is distinguishable from the commonly
used term “piercing the corporate veil,” which is a way to hold corporate shareholders personally liable.
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998) (summarizing that “the corporate veil may be pierced
and the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form would
otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder’s
behalf.”).
132. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673–74.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. See also R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of “Intent” and the
Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 320–22 (1991). But see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American
Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 210–13 (1991) (raising concerns that mental states for environmental crimes
come close to strict liability).
136. Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”--A Critique of the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 290 (2012).
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to both civil and criminal liability for environmental crimes.137 Indeed, even Congress has embraced the doctrine by amending the Clean Air Act 138 and the Clean
Water Act139 to include “any responsible corporate officer” in the definition of
“person.” Critics of the doctrine have, however, argued it has “an eroding effect on
the element of mens rea”140 and that the doctrine “creates a rare type of strict and
vicarious liability.”141
The Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine also applies to civil cases. 142
The rationale that a corporate officer will be deterred through monetary penalties
parallels the idea that incarcerating a corporate officer will result in deterrence. 143
And while using the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine—which has elements
of vicarious liability—may be viewed by some as questionable in the criminal context, these concerns are minimalized in the civil context. 144 One court stated “the
rationale for holding corporate officers criminally responsible for acts of the corporation, which could lead to incarceration, is even more persuasive where only civil
liability is involved, which at most would result in a monetary penalty.” 145 Critics
of the civil application of the Responsible Corporate Officers Doctrine argue that
the doctrine should not be applied because the very purpose of incorporating is to
avoid this sort of civil liability. 146 However, proponents of civil application say
individual corporate officers should be held responsible in cases involving public
health and safety.147 Additionally, proponents argue Congress worded many environmental statutes to hold individuals, “such as owners and operators of facilities,”
personally liable irrespective of whether or not they are corporate officers. 148

137. Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine or “Responsible
Relationship” of Corporate Officer to Corporate Violation of Law, 119 A.L.R.5TH 205, § 1[a] (2004).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2012).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2012).
141. Petrin, supra note 136, at 296.
141. Petrin, supra note 136, at 300; see also Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y. F. 1, 8–9 (2004) (asserting that under the doctrine, corporate officers may be held criminally liable on the basis of their position in a company even
though they have no actual knowledge of the conduct); David C. Fortney, Thinking Outside the “Black
Box”: Tailored Enforcement in Environmental Criminal Law, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1624–25 (2003) (arguing that “we should hesitate before applying strict liability criminal sanctions to corporate officers for the
malfeasance of their employees”); Thomas Mortell & Michelle Gustavson, The Resurgence of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 55 ADVOCATE 32 (2012) (arguing against the Responsible Corporate
Officers Doctrine in the health care context in Idaho).
142. Petrin, supra note 136, at 291.
143. United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 1985).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Noël Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283,
292 (2002).
147. Id. at 292–93.
148. Id.
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D. Environmental Laws Affected by Southern Union
It is important to look at the different statutes that are used in environmental
crime to understand the effect Southern Union will have on environmental criminal
enforcement. Because Southern Union only applies to criminal trials, this section
will only mention criminal portions of environmental statutes—not including civil
or administrative penalties. It is also important to point out that Southern Union has
applications outside of environmental law in other areas of white-collar crime,149
but the scope of this article is limited to environmental law. Further, Southern Union’s application to environmental law is limited to certain environmental statutes.
Therefore, it is important to delineate what provisions of environmental statutes
Southern Union affects and give a brief overview of some of the large federal environmental crime laws that will be affected by Southern Union. Additionally, because Southern Union was decided on a constitutional basis, it also applies to state
laws.150 For example, there is an Idaho environmental crime law that is affected by
Southern Union.151
The government normally has three options in environmental criminal fine
cases.152 It can either (1) charge under the statute of conviction which may charge
on a fixed amount or charge on a per-day violation scheme; (2) charge under 18
U.S.C. § 3571(c), which has a maximum fine of $500,000 for felonies or $200,000
for misdemeanors; or (3) it can charge under Alternative Fines Act and get a fine
that is twice the gain or loss resulting from the crime.153 Southern Union has applications in two areas; it has applications if the government chooses to seek a per-day
criminal fine or chooses to pursue a criminal restitution fine under the Alternative
Fines Act.154
Thus, fines under both the Alternative Fines Act and various per-day violation
statutes are the main types of fines that are affected by Southern Union.155 It should
also be noted that many of the environmental statutes explored in this article are
expansive and “contain overlapping civil, criminal, and administrative penalt[ies.]”156 The article will, however, focus exclusively on the criminal portions of
these statutes to give an overview of what statutes the ruling in Southern Union
affected.
As mentioned above, the Alternative Fines Act was affected by the ruling in
Southern Union. The Alternative Fines Act allows criminal fines above the statutory maximum in amounts equal to twice the economic gain or loss of the offense of

149. Kresta Daly, Southern Union Case has Implications for White Collar Criminal and Civil
Trials, BARTH, TOZER & DALY LLP (Sept. 26, 2012), http://btdlegal.com/southern-union-case-hasimplications-for-white-collar-criminal-and-civil-trials/.
150. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating that the ruling applies to both federal and state
laws).
151. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-117 (West 2013).
152. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 4–5.
153. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 4–5.
154. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5.
155. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5.
156. Klementowicz, supra note 99, at 544; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)–(d) (2006) (including
both civil and administrative penalties in the Clean Air Act for violations of implementation plans and
criminal penalties for “knowing” violations of implementation plans).
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the conviction.157 The Alternative Fines Act states: “If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice
the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” 158 Under the
Alternative Fines Act it is possible to have a fine in the millions, if not billions, of
dollars when a statutory maximum may only be a $500,000.159 As a result of Southern Union, a defendant who is convicted under a per-day violation scheme under
the Alternative Fines Act will have far more reason to challenge each day of the
government’s fine demand.160 This will make the imposition of criminal fines increasingly difficult and expensive for the government. 161 However, it is also possible that evidence used to show fines on each day could be prejudicial for a defendant as explored earlier in this article.162
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is another statute with
a criminal environmental provision that was affected by Southern Union. In fact,
RCRA is the environmental statute that was at issue in Southern Union.163 Under
RCRA, violations involving knowing transportation of waste to an improper facility or knowing treatment, storage, or disposal of waste under RCRA are punishable
by “a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation.” 164 This is the quintessential sort of per-day criminal statutory fine provision that Southern Union affects.
The Clean Water Act also has per-day criminal fine statutory provisions that
will be impacted by Southern Union. The Clean Water Act has per day criminal
fines for both negligent violations and knowing violations. 165 Negligent violations
are punishable by “not less than $2,500 [or] more than $25,000 per day of violation.”166 Knowing violations are punishable by fines “of not less than $5,000 nor
more than $50,000 per day of violation.” 167 The Alternative Fines Act also may
apply to any provision of the Clean Water Act and can create higher fines.168 Thus,
the Clean Water Act will be impacted by Southern Union in its per-day fine provisions and its use of the Alternative Fines Act.

157. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
160. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5–6.
161. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5–6.
162. See supra text accompanying note 91.
163. United States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d, 630 F.3d 17
(1st Cir. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (U.S. 2012).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2011).
165. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006).
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2006).
167. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(B) (2006).
168. See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 532–34 (4th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the
Clean Water Act to include the Alternative Fines Act, which subjected the defendant to a Class A misdemeanor fine of $100,000 per violation instead of the Clean Water Act’s maximum fine of $25,000 per day
of violation).

132

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50

Another federal statute that will be impacted by Southern Union is the Toxic
Substance Control Act. Under the Toxic Substance Control Act, a criminal fine for
a knowing or willful violation involves “a fine of not more than $25,000 for each
day of violation.”169 This is yet another per-day environmental criminal fine that
Southern Union will impact.
It is also important to note the ruling in Southern Union applies to both federal and state rulings.170 The Court, in Southern Union, held that the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments along with the Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees require that all facts that increase a defendant’s maximum criminal fine be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 171
This constitutional holding applies to both federal and state laws. 172 For example,
Idaho also has a state per-day statutory provision that will be impacted by Southern
Union in its environmental quality statute.173 In the criminal violations section of
Idaho’s environmental quality statute, Idaho provides multiple per-day fines.174
These include $1,000 per day for continuing negligence violations; $10,000 per day
for a violation of “the provisions of the air quality public health or environmental
protection laws” and a $250,000 per day fine for a crime that “places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”175 These Idaho per-day
fines are the types of fines that Southern Union impacts.
III. PREDICTION ON HOW THESE CASES WILL PROCEED
Southern Union will undoubtedly change environmental enforcement, and, as
a result, components of the environmental justice system will have to make adjustments. In particular, Southern Union will change environmental enforcement in
five areas discussed and analyzed below. These five areas of changes will result in
new choices for both defendants and the government. The first area of adjustment
will involve the changes prosecutors will have to make in indictment and verdicts
as a result of Southern Union.176 Next, the second area of change will involve the
sort of inferences a jury can make in criminal fine cases. 177 After that there will be a
third change resulting from the complications Southern Union creates in environmental crime trials, which may tend to encourage more guilty pleas and fewer trials.178 After that there will be a fourth adjustment because prosecutors should now,
more than ever, seek individual sentences involving incarceration in criminal environmental cases.179 Finally, a fifth legal change could result from the possible expansion of the Apprendi rule into civil cases.180 All these changes, resulting from

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (2006).
See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2352 (2012).
Id. at 2350–51.
Id. at 2348.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-117 (West 2013).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part III.E.
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Southern Union, will result in new challenges and complications in environmental
crime cases.
A. Indictment and Verdict Complications
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Southern Union was
tied to the government’s indictment of the Southern Union Company. Indictments
serve as the initial pleading in a criminal case and, like other pleadings, they require
that the government state every element of the charged crime. 181 The government’s
indictment in Southern Union was fatal because it did not specify the precise dates
when the Southern Union Company committed a RCRA violation—a fact that affected the size of the company’s criminal fine.182 Since the indictment did not specify the dates when a violation took place, it did not contain all the facts relevant to
the Southern Union Company’s criminal fine. 183 In effect, the lack of specificity in
the dates of violation in the indictment opened the door to a district judge having to
determine how many days the RCRA violation occurred in sentencing.184 However,
the indictment would not have violated the Apprendi rule if, hypothetically, the
government had made a specific charge for each of the 752 days of violation. 185
Making a charge for each day of violation, however, would undoubtedly be cumbersome.
In most environmental crime cases the government has two options with such
fines.186 It can either (1) charge on a per-day violation scheme to get a fine that is
cumulatively large or (2) it can charge under the Alternative Fines Act and get a
fine that is twice the gain or loss resulting from the crime. 187
Under the first option, the per-day violation scheme, the government still has
many choices.188 The government could have an indictment that has a count for
each day of violation or it could charge during a specific time span and include a
special verdict form on which the jury could specify its findings as to which dates
the violation occurred over.189 It is likely that the government will use the special
verdict form option in most cases because having a count for each day of violation
would be too cumbersome.190 Such special verdict forms have been recognized as
an excellent way to have juries deliberate on complex cases.191 Thus, “[w]hen multiple offenses are submitted to a jury, special verdicts are often helpful to an orderly

181. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY MANUAL, at VII-4 (1991).
182. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349 (2012).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Kate H. Nepveu, Note, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 288–89 (2003).
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deliberative process.”192 These verdict forms provide a mechanism for prosecutors
to get “per-day” convictions and comply with the Sixth Amendment.
Under the second option, the Alternative Fines Act, the government will be at
a disadvantage because of Southern Union.193 The government would be at a disadvantage because it would have to face more scrutiny from the defense in its calculation to prove gain or loss resulting from the crime.194 Defendants will have far more
reason to challenge the government’s calculation of gain or loss before the jury. 195
Under either option, in cases where the government is not certain it can prove
exact dates of violation or gain or loss resulting from the crime because of limitations in witnesses or reporting, it is likely that Southern Union will place the government at a disadvantage.196 In those cases, the government may be better off following some alternative form of liability, such as civil penalties where Southern
Union doesn’t apply. However, many options still exist and Southern Union will
not greatly reduce convictions in criminal environmental cases. Indeed, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has been treating the Sixth Amendment
as though it is applicable to criminal fines in anticipation of a case like Southern
Union and four of its five top antitrust fines imposed in the last quarter century
have been obtained under the more rigorous standard. 197
B. Jury Inferences
Another area where issues arise under Southern Union involves the types of
inferences a jury is allowed to make. This issue can be stated as a hypothetical.
When Southern Union is remanded,198 will the jury have to see evidence of a violation on all 752 days charged, or will the jury be allowed to infer a 752-day violation
after seeing evidence establishing a violation on a certain number of days? If so,
how many days are needed to allow the jury to make permissible inferences regarding the number of days where a violation took place?
Generally, a jury is allowed to “infer, on the basis of [their] reason, experience and common sense, from one or more established facts, [or] the existence of
some other fact.”199 A jury may base such inferences on their common sense. 200
However, because juries make these determinations on a different burden of proof
standard than judges, Southern Union effectively changed the burden of proof that
is used in such inferences to a higher standard as discussed below.
Thus, what Southern Union changed is the burden of proof that is, effectively,
used in inferences and factual findings involving criminal fines. The Sentencing
Guidelines do not state which standard of proof is applicable when judges make
192. Id. (quoting State v. Diaz, 677 A.2d 1120, 1127–28 (N.J. 1996)).
193. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 5.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16, S. Union Co. v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (No. 11-94), 2011 WL 3664464.
198. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012) (remanding to the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island).
199. 1 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL VOLUMES) § 6.01 (Sand et al. 2013).
200. Id.
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factual findings during sentencing. 201 Prior to the Southern Union holding, judges
were making factual findings in sentencing that increased a criminal defendant’s
fines on a preponderance of the evidence standard 202 rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard203 employed by juries.204 In fact, most circuits used the preponderance standard.205 However, this changed with the ruling in Southern Union.206 In effect, Southern Union raised the government’s burden of proof.207 Southern Union holds that any fact that increases a defendant’s sentence, including fines,
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.208 Thus, Southern Union raised the government’s burden of proof in many instances. This is an
affirmation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal matters.
C. Complicated Trials
Another area that Southern Union will change will be the overall complication of jury trials in criminal environmental cases involving fines. 209 Additional
evidence and time will have to be put into such cases. As Justice Breyer pointed out
in his fifteen-page dissent, further complicating the trial requirements in cases involving criminal fines would only create more plea deals and less actual trials.210
He argued that a justice system where “plea bargaining is ‘not some adjunct to the
criminal justice system [but] is the criminal justice system’” is problematic because
prosecutors are advocates and not neutral adjudicators. 211 Thus, he stated the opinion would only perpetuate a justice system where 97% of federal convictions and
94% of state convictions are plea bargains. 212
This prediction mirrors statistics and comments made about plea bargaining
and the justice system in other areas. In some federal districts, the plea rate in crim201. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 3.
202. “The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof requires that the factfinder determine
whether a fact sought to be proved is more probable than not, and essentially allocates the risk of error
equally among the parties involved.” 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1627 (2013).
203. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard means “[t]he evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction whenever, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Parker v.
Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2152 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
204. United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 34 n.14 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating a judge may
make factual findings relating to restitution that increase fines in sentencing by a preponderance standard
because the juries guilty verdict “automatically authorizes restitution in the full amount of the victim’s
losses”), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
205. Pasfield, supra note 2, at 3.
206. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2346 (2012).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See James, supra note 5. Such complicated trials are in addition to environmental crime statutory schemes that have been characterized by some commentators as “mind-numbingly complex.”
Uhlmann, supra note 5, at 1224.
210. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2357, 2371 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2371 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Symposium, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992).
212. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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inal convictions has been cited as over 99%.213 Thus, some commentators have
suggested in many cases a prosecutor plays a role as both the prosecutor and final
adjudicator of a defendant’s case.214 Conversely, other commentators have argued
plea bargaining results in greater trial efficiency and effectively saves the public
money.215 Either way, plea bargaining has taken hold of the criminal justice system
and is now the most common form of criminal case resolution.216 Thus, the concern
is that Southern Union will serve as yet another incentive to strike a plea bargain
because of the increased complications of environmental crime cases.
D. Individual Liability
Additionally, under Southern Union prosecutors have increased incentives to
pursue individual liability that results in jail sentences because of the additional
complications Southern Union adds to cases involving criminal fines.217 This is a
positive result of the ruling because individual enforcement is commonly believed
to result in greater deterrence for environmental crime since it comes with the
threat of jail time.218 Prosecutors should now, more than ever, pursue individual
corporate officer responsibility in environmental cases to provide strong disincentives to environmental crimes, which can result in serious risks to the public at
large.219
Such an emphasis on individual enforcement already exists in some government agencies and Southern Union simply gives another argument to perpetuate
this emphasis. For example, the EPA prefers individual enforcement because it
provides greater deterrence for environmental crime. 220 A recent emphasis in individual enforcement has led to about 70% individual enforcement and 30% criminal
enforcement by the EPA.221 The EPA’s emphasis in individual enforcement shows
the government can go one step further and achieve greater environmental crime
deterrence by taking Southern Union as an indication that it should pursue even
more individual enforcement in such cases.
213. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1409, 1415 (2003).
214. Id. at 1409 (stating “[A]merican criminal justice systems have become administrative systems run by executive-branch officials (namely, prosecutors)”); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2548 (2004) (arguing “[l]aw’s shadow
disappears” as defendant’s “[b]argain in the shadow of prosecutors’ preferences, budget constraints, and
political trends”).
215. Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 601 (2005) (claiming
“[T]hat plea bargaining is justified because it largely mirrors the results that would have occurred after a
highly regulated trial process, discounted to reflect uncertainty and adjudication costs”).
216. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (stating “[P]lea
bargaining has triumphed. Bloodlessly and clandestinely, it has swept across the penal landscape and driven
our vanquished jury into small pockets of resistance”).
217. See Pasfield, supra note 2, at 4–5 (stating the government may be at a disadvantage in proving some per-day fines and Alternative Fines Act fines under Southern Union).
218. See, e.g., EPA, supra note 100 (stating “corporate managers will think twice about deliberately breaking the law if they understand that they face incarceration and personal criminal fines for criminal conduct, rather than consequences that will be borne solely by the company”).
219. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 123 (stating there is often “a substantial risk of great
public harm” with environmental crimes, which are often public welfare crimes).
220. EPA, supra note 100, at 6.
221. Id.
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E. Application to Civil Cases
As a consequence of Southern Union, the government now has more reason
than ever to seek civil penalties, instead of criminal penalties, because fewer facts
will have to be found by the jury in civil cases.222 In response, it is likely some defendants will argue the Apprendi rule should apply to the determination of facts that
affect civil fines under various environmental statutes.223 Even before Southern
Union was decided there was argument for applying the Apprendi rule to civil cases.224 One area where these arguments have come up is in the context of Securities
and Exchange Commission civil penalties.225 In those cases, defendants are arguing
Congress’s “civil” label is not determinative and certain “civil” statutes that are
punitive in nature should be considered criminal for the purpose of constitutional
protections provided to the defendant. 226
This argument follows the Supreme Court’s analysis, which can be seen in
United States v. Ward.227 Under this analysis, a civil statute’s label is not determinative because constitutional protections reserved for criminal cases have been applied to statutes that Congress has labeled “civil.” 228 The question of whether a
statute is criminal or civil is a question of statutory construction that is based on a
two-part analysis.229 First, courts look at whether Congress expressly or impliedly
labeled a statute as criminal or civil.230 Second, if Congress has labeled a provision
as a civil penalty, courts inquire, “further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.” 231 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez the Court listed seven factors that may be examined to determine if
a civil statute is so punitive it is criminal in nature.232 These factors include:
[1] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation
222. Dorothy Heyl, United States: Be Careful What You Wish For – SEC Penalties Act and
‘Southern
Union,’
MONDAQ
(Jan.
3,
2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/213716/Securities/Be+Careful+What+You+Wish+For+SEC+Penal
ties+Act+And+Southern+Union.
223. See id.
224. See W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In Re Winship,
Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 178 (2011) (arguing the Apprendi rule
should be applied to civil commitments of sexual predators).
225. Daly, supra note 149 (stating “[i]n addition [Southern Union] may be extremely important to
defendants in civil enforcement actions. In an SEC enforcement case the Ninth Circuit is presently considering whether a jury must decide that facts that enhance penalties where a defendant is being punished by
the imposition of significant monetary penalties. Under this new decision a civil defendant facing such
penalties may not be in a substantially different position than a criminal defendant for the purposes of a
Sixth Amendment analysis.”).
226. Heyl, supra note 222.
227. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 248–249.
232. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).

138

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50

will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6]
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.233
Arguably, many of these factors apply to large civil fines assessed against
corporations. The first two factors—whether a penalty is a disability or restrain and
has historically been regarded as punishment—were answered affirmatively by the
justices in Southern Union.234 The fourth and fifth elements—whether a sentence
accomplishes deterrence and whether a sentence has criminal overlap—arguably
also apply to multi-million dollar fines assessed against corporations.235 If a civil
environmental statutory scheme has any kind of scienter requirements, all of the
Kennedy factors would arguably apply to it.236
However, the Supreme Court in Ward determined civil fines under the Clean
Water Act are not criminal in nature.237 The ruling in Ward demonstrates environmental defendants will be unsuccessful in arguing the Apprendi rule should apply
to civil fines unless there is some sort of scienter requirement. 238The general lack of
the scienter element in civil actions under federal environmental statutes239 should
prevent the Apprendi rule from being applied to civil environmental cases. This is
encouraging because any kind of widespread application of the Apprendi rule in
civil environmental cases would unnecessarily burden environmental enforcement
with increased cost and complications. 240
IV. CONCLUSION
Southern Union added a new layer of complexity to environmental crime cases dramatically changing how certain cases will be litigated. These complications
are particularly important because they have impacts for both federal and state environmental laws.241 As outlined previously, in environmental law these complications will be seen in five areas.
233. Id.
234. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2353–2357 (2012); Heyl, supra note 222.
235. Heyl, supra note 222 (arguing all the Kennedy factors apply to huge fines assessed against
companies).
236. See id.
237. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250–51 (ruling on the Clean Water Act which is also
known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
238. See, e.g., Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Callaway, No. S–10–1801, 2012 WL 947483, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (rejecting the argument that civil penalties under the Clean Water Act should
be considered criminal).
239. See, e.g., EPA, ENFORCEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATIONS, III-217,
http://www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/pubs/orientat/rom310.pdf (showing intent is not an element of any
RCRA civil enforcement action).
240. Contra Ball, supra note 224, at 175 (arguing for the application of the Apprendi rule to certain civil situations by stating “Apprendi, ultimately, is not an entirely new doctrine whose application to
novel situations should be avoided for fear of unintended consequences. It’s a collection of older doctrines.
The Court already knows how to deal with due process--it should not shy away from due process analysis
with an Apprendi label slapped on it.”).
241. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating the ruling applies to both federal and state laws).
Environmental law has many applications in Idaho industries, such as agriculture and resource extraction.
See, e.g., United States. v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1007–09 (9th Cir. 2001), supplemented, 27 F. App’x 750
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First, indictments and verdicts now will require greater specificity in particular facts relating to a criminal fine. 242 Prosecutors will now have to consider using
special verdict forms in per day fines, and defendants will have increasing reason to
challenge every fact under an Alternative Fines Act fine.243
Second, juries will make factual inferences at trial on the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, rather than the lower preponderance standard that was previously
used by judges in sentencing.244 This will make it more difficult for the government
to prove facts relating to elements of an environmental crime.245 Along with complications in indictments and verdicts, this heightened burden of proof will probably make it far more complicated and difficult for prosecutors to get as large of
criminal environmental fines.246 However, the government still has a veritable
plethora of options in punishing defendants for environmental misconduct. 247 As
demonstrated previously in this article, in many cases the government can pursue
either criminal or civil liability as well as corporate or individual liability. 248 Smart
prosecutors will always weigh these options to try and create maximum judicial
efficiency and deterrence in environmental misconduct. Federal prosecutors have a
high rate of conviction in environmental cases,249 and Southern Union should not
greatly alter prosecutors’ conviction rates if prosecutors effectively use the other
options that are available to them.
Third, Southern Union will further complicate criminal trials that result in environmental fines, most likely resulting in more plea bargains.250 In this way,
Southern Union is part of a larger trend favoring plea bargains in resolving criminal
cases.251 This is also a bit of a double-edged sword for the criminal justice system.
On one hand, it may result in greater judicial efficiency and smooth out some of the
random effects that juries perpetuate.252 However, it also means defendants spend
(9th Cir. 2001) (sentencing a defendant fertilizer company owner to a restitution fine of 6.3 million dollars
for knowingly exposing his employees to a tank of cyanide). Elias is an example of the repercussions some
of these federal criminal statutes can have on Idaho defendants. Id. In Elias, an Idaho fertilizer company
owner was sentenced to seventeen years in prison for knowingly exposing his employees to a tank of cyanide. Id. Additionally, the defendant in Elias received a criminal restitution fine of 6.3 million dollars. Id. at
1009 (this fine was later overturned by the Ninth Circuit because Congress had not authorized restitution
fines for knowingly exposing someone to hazardous waste under RCRA; however, the overturning of the
fine had nothing to do with the Aprendi rule). Though the fine was later overturned on different grounds,
such restitution fines involve facts that could have been determined in sentencing and, thus, may be subject
to the ruling in Southern Union. Id. at 1021–22; Ellis Paeffgen & Bruce Pasfield, Supreme Court Opinion in
Southern Union Changes Burden of Proof for Imposition of Criminal Fines, ALSTON AND BIRD LLP (June
26, 2012), http://www.alston.com/environmentalandlandblog/blog.aspx?entry=4609.
242. See supra Part III.A.
243. See supra Part III.A.
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See supra Part III.B.
247. See supra Part II.C; see generally The Choice Between Civil and Criminal Sanctions, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1979).
248. See supra Part II.C.
249. See EPA, supra note 100 at 5.
250. See supra Part III.C.
251. Wright & Miller, supra note 213, at 1415.
252. Howe, supra note 215, at 601.
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less time in front of a neutral judge in favor of having a larger proportion of their
cases being determined by what bargain the prosecutor is willing to strike. 253 As the
dissenters in Southern Union pointed out, this is a fundamental change in the
American system of criminal justice. 254 Southern Union just shows the perpetuation
of this trend in the area of criminal fines.255
Fourth, prosecutors have increased incentives to pursue individual liability,
which can lead to personal fines or jail sentences, because of the additional complications Southern Union adds to cases involving criminal fines. 256 These incentives
will result in more effective environmental enforcement because individual enforcement results in more deterrence than corporate enforcement. 257
Finally, courts might have to address whether the doctrine has any application
to environmental civil penalties.258 Any expansion of the Apprendi rule into the
civil arena would be a large expansion of the doctrine. 259 However, it seems unlikely that an argument for such an expansion could occur, unless the argument was
based on a civil environmental statute with a scienter requirement. 260
Despite all these increased complications in environmental crime, Southern
Union is a means of guaranteeing fundamental rights to criminal defendants faced
with a criminal fine. As such, Southern Union is a logical step towards guaranteeing fundamental jury rights in environmental cases. It is a reaffirmation of the fundamental Sixth Amendment right and the fact that the criminal stigma should only
be imposed after it has been painstakingly proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In
Southern Union, the Supreme Court was correct in making the law reflect the fact
that there is certainly a far larger stigma in a $50,000,000 criminal fine than a
$10,000 criminal fine. Even though Southern Union leads to a whole series of
complications, the government still has many ways to prosecute environmental
violations. One thing is certain. In the wake of Southern Union, both defendants
and the government will have many new arguments and strategies to use in environmental crime cases.
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